Profile framework for token processing system

ABSTRACT

Embodiments of the present invention provide a profile framework for handling enrollment requests. In particular, when a token processing system receives an enrollment request, it selects an applicable profile based on information in the request. The profile may indicate a variety of parameters for fulfilling the enrollment request, such as the locations of the applicable certificate authority, token key service, and the like. The profile may also indicate items, such as the number of keys to generate on a token, a token label, and connection information to securely communicate with other components and the client making the enrollment request.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is related to pending U.S. patent application Ser. No.11/446,956, entitled “Methods and Systems For Key Escrow” filed Jun. 6,2006 and commonly assigned, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/447,196,entitled “Methods And Systems For Secure Key Delivery,” filed Jun. 6,2006 and commonly assigned, U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/462,606,entitled “Methods And Systems for Managing identity Management SecurityDomains,” filed concurrently and commonly assigned,

FIELD

This invention generally relates to secure client-server systems. Moreparticularly, the invention relates to managing token requests such asenrollment based on a token profile framework.

DESCRIPTION OF THE RELATED ART

Although smart cards are often compared to hard drives, they are“secured drives with a brain”—they store and process information. Smartcards are storage devices with the core mechanics to facilitatecommunication with a reader or coupler. They have file systemconfigurations and the ability to be partitioned into public and privatespaces that can be made available or locked. They also have segregatedareas for protected information, such as certificates, e-purses, andentire operating systems. In addition to traditional data storagestates, such as read-only and read/write, some vendors are working withsub-states best described as “add only” and “update only.”

The physical characteristics of smart cards are governed byinternational standards. For example, the size of a card is covered byISO-7810. ISO-7816 and subsequent standards cover manufacturingparameters, physical and electrical characteristics, location of thecontact points, communication protocols, data storage, and more. Datalayout and format, however, can vary from vendor to vendor.

Smart cards are a way to increase security especially for enterprisesystems. Enterprise system often contain valuable information such asfinancial data, personnel records, strategies, etc., that may becritical for the entity administrating the enterprise system. Moreover,smart cards may offer a method to control access to data within theenterprise systems. Accordingly, the reasons to use smart card areplentiful.

However, there are drawbacks and disadvantages to smart cards.Typically, smart cards require sophisticated systems to support themanagement of their security information. For example, in order toenroll a smart card, numerous tasks, such as generating keys andobtaining certificates, must be performed. These tasks can be complexand difficult to perform. In addition, if a user loses or has the smartcard, the user cannot access the information. The user may obtain areplacement smart card for access, but the system administrator may haveto perform a substantial number of tasks to allow the user to regainaccess to his original data.

Therefore, there is a need for efficiently enrolling a user and theirsmart cards. In addition, there is a need to enroll a user and theirsmart cards to accommodate various security policies and applications.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In accordance with one feature invention, a method of generatingcredentials for a token is provided. The token and the serverdetermining that the token is to be enrolled are detected. A profile isselected for a request of the token. A subject key pair within theserver is then generated. The subject key pair includes a subject publickey and the subject private key. The subject private key is encryptedwith a key transport session key to arrive at a wrapped private key andthe wrapped private key is forwarded to the token.

In accordance with another feature of the present invention, a systemfor generating credentials for a token is provided. The system comprisesa token, a security client, and a security server. The security clientis configured to manage the token. The security server is configured tointerface with the security client and detect the token to be enrolledby the security server. The security server selects a profile forenrolling the token and generates a subject key pair within the securityserver. The subject key pair includes a subject public key and thesubject private key. The security server may encrypt the subject privatekey with a key transport session key to arrive at a wrapped private keyand then forward the wrapped private key to the token.

Additional features of the present invention will be set forth in partin the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from thedescription, or may be learned by practice of the invention. It is to beunderstood that both the foregoing general description and the followingdetailed description are exemplary and explanatory only and are notrestrictive of the invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute apart of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the invention andtogether with the description, serve to explain the principles of theinvention. In the figures:

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary system in accordance with an embodiment;

FIG. 2 illustrates an architectural diagram of the security client andserver in accordance with another embodiment;

FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary flow diagram in accordance with yetanother embodiment; and

FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary computing machine.

DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

Embodiments of the present invention provide a profile framework forhandling token requests, such as enrollment, pin reset requests, formatrequests, and other types of requests. In particular, when a tokenprocessing system receives an enrollment request, it selects anapplicable profile based on information in the request. The profile mayindicate a variety of parameters for fulfilling the enrollment request,such as the locations of the applicable certificate authority, token keyservice, and the like. The profile may also indicate items, such as thenumber of keys to generate on a token, a token label, and connectioninformation to securely communicate with other components and the clientmaking the enrollment requests or other type of requests.

Reference will now be made in detail to exemplary embodiments of theinvention, which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. Whereverpossible, the same reference numbers will be used throughout thedrawings to refer to the same or like parts. For simplicity andillustrative purposes, the principles of the present invention aredescribed by referring mainly to exemplary embodiments thereof. However,one of ordinary skill in the art would readily recognize that the sameprinciples are equally applicable to, and can be implemented in, alltypes of secure distributed environments and that any such variations donot depart from the true spirit and scope of the present invention.Moreover, in the following detailed description, references are made tothe accompanying figures, which illustrate specific embodiments.Electrical, mechanical, logical and structural changes may be made tothe embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of thepresent invention. The following detailed description is, therefore, notto be taken in a limiting sense and the scope of the present inventionis defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Embodiments of the present invention generally relate to an enterprisesecurity (ES) system executing on a server with a security clientexecuting on a user desktop (erg., Windows, Linux, Mac). The securityclient may be configured to interface with the ES system and provide aninterface to manage a smart card, communicate with ES system, act as aproxy for application program data units (APDUs) sent between the ESsystem and the smart card, and display user interfaces (UIs) as the ESsystem directs (for example, prompting user for credentials and/or PIN,displaying smart card status, etc.).

The ES system may include a token management system (TMS, or a securityserver). The TPS may be configured to act as the registration authorityand to direct the entire enrollment process. The TPS may also beconfigured as the only entity in the ES system to construct the APDUs,which are the message format understood by the smart card. The TMS mayinterface with a token processing system (TPS) to a token key service(TKS) module, a data recovery manager (DRM) module and a certificateauthority (CA) module through a firewall.

In various embodiments, smart cards (more generally tokens) may beconfigured to store an applet (a small application) and three keys. Thethree keys may be derived from a master key held by the manufacturer andthe card identification number. The derivation of the keys may beimplemented by applying a pre-defined function(s) to the master key andthe card identification number. One of the keys may be a key encryptionkey, KEK. The security client may detect the presence of an insertedtoken in an associated card reader and inform TPS of the token.

The TPS may begin an initialization process that may include the TPSdetermining whether the applet on the token is outdated and whether themaster key has changed since the three keys stored on the token weregenerated. If any of these conditions are true, the TPS may perform a“key update” in the event of the outdated master key and an “appletupgrade” in the event of outdated applet. As part of the update, the TPSmay deliver new keys (derived within the TMS system from the new masterkey) and/or an updated applet to the token to be stored/injectedtherein.

The TPS may also determine that the token may need to be initializedwith server-side generated keys and key archival for those generatedkeys. More specifically, the TPS may be configured to provide tools thatallow a system administrator to set policies to manage users. Forexample, the system administrator may set a policy where a group ofusers may have their tokens be enrolled with server-side key generationand key archival of those generated keys.

Accordingly, the security client may transmit a serial number, cardunique identification, or card identification (CID) to the TPS of theTMS. The TPS may be configured to forward the CID of the token to theTKS module. The TKS module may be configured to derive a series of keysbased on the server master key and the CID. One of the derived keys isthe key encryption key, KEK, which is configured to encrypt other secretkeys. The TKS module is also configured to generate a key transportsession key, KTSK. The TKS module may encrypt the key transport sessionkey, KTSK, with the key encryption key, KEK, i.e., wrap, to arrive at afirst encrypted or wrapped key transport session key, KEK(KTSK).

The TKS module may be initially configured to hold a public key of theDRM module, which for the sake of convenience will be referred as aserver transport key, STK. The TKS module may include an encryptedsecure database where the server transport key, STK, is stored. The TKSmodule may wrap the key transport session key, KTSK, with the servertransport key, STK, to arrive at a second wrapped key transport sessionkey, STK(KTSK). The TKS module may forward the first wrapped keytransport session key, KEK(KTSK) and the second wrapped transportsession key STK(KTSK) to the TPS.

The TPS may be configured to forward the second wrapped server transportkey, STK(KTSK) and the server-side key generation request to the DRMmodule while temporarily holding the first wrapped key transport sessionkey, KEK(KTSK). The DRM module may be configured to generate anasymmetric key pair, i.e., a subject public and a subject private(SPuK/SPrivK, respectively) key pair, where the subject may represent auser, device, or other entity such as organization, association, etc.

The DRM module may retrieve a storage key, SK, which may be a permanentprivate storage key owned by the DRM module and generate a storagesession key, SSK. The DRM module may encrypt or wrap the subject privatekey, SPrivK, with the storage session key, SSK, to arrive at a wrappedstorage private key, SSK(SPrivK). The DRM module may also encrypt thestorage session key, SSK, with the storage key, SK, to arrive at awrapped storage session key, SK(SSK). The wrapped storage private key,SSK(SPrivK) and the storage session key, SSK, may then be archived orescrowed by the DRM module. The archived keys (SSK(SPrivK) and SK(SSK))may be used for later recovery in the event of a lost or destroyedtoken.

The DRM module may then decrypt, i.e., unwrap, the second wrappedtransport session key, STK(KTSK), with the complementary key of theserver transport key, STK, stored in the DRM module to retrieve the keytransport session key, KTSK. The DRM module may then wrap the subjectprivate key, SPrivK, with the key transport session key as a wrappedprivate key, KTSK(SPrivK) and forward the wrapped private key,KTSK(SPrivK) and the subject public key, SPuK, to the TPS.

The TPS may forward the wrapped private key, KTSK(SPrivK) and the firstwrapped key transport session key, KEK(KTSK), to the security client towrite into the token. The forwarded wrapped keys (KEK(KTSK) andKTSK(SPrivK)) are received at the token to be injected therein. For thesake of completeness, the token may execute an applet that can retrievethe key encryption key, KEK, which the manufacturer had derived andstored or the TMS has updated and stored Accordingly, the applet mayunwrap the first wrapped key transport session key, KEK(KTSK) toretrieve the key transport session key, KTSK. The applet then uses thekey transport session key to unwrapped the wrapped private key,KTSK(SPrivK) to retrieve the subject private key, SPrivK.

The TPS may be further configured to send a certificate enrollmentrequest with the information regarding the subject public key, SPuK, tothe CA module for certificates for the token. The TPS may subsequentlyforward received certificates from the CA module to the token.Subsequently, the certificates are written into the token.

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary secure system 100 in accordance with anembodiment. It should be readily apparent to those of ordinary skill inthe art that the system 100 depicted in FIG. 1 represents a generalizedschematic illustration and that other components may be added orexisting components may be removed or modified. Moreover, the system 100may be implemented using software components, hardware components, orcombinations thereof.

As shown in FIG. 1, the secure system 100 includes a server 105, clients110 and a local network 115. The server 105 may be a computing machineor platform configured to execute a token management system 120 througha multiple user operating system (not shown) in conjunction with theclients 110. The server 105 may be implemented with server platforms asknown to those skilled in the art from Intel, Advanced Micro Devices,Hewlett-Packard, etc.

The server 105 may interact with the clients over the local network 115.The local network 115 may be a local area network implementing anestablished network protocol such as Ethernet, token ring, FDDI, etc.The local network 115 provides a communication channel for the server105 and clients 110 to exchange data and commands.

The clients 110 may be computing machine or platform (machine)configured to execute secure and open applications through themulti-user operating system. The clients 110 may be implemented withpersonal computers, workstations, thin clients, thick clients, or othersimilar computing platform. The clients 110 may use operating systemssuch as Linux, Windows, Macintosh or other available operating system.

Each client 110 may be configured to interface with a security device125. The security device 125 may be configured to act as a gatekeeper tothe client 110. More particularly, a user may use a security token, suchas a smart card, to access the respective client 110. Each client 110may have a security client 130 executing to monitor the security device125.

The security client 130 may be configured to manage the token. Morespecifically, the security client 130 may enroll the token, recoverykeys for the token or reset a personal identification number for thetoken. The security client 130 may also be configured to interface withthe token management system 120 and act as a proxy for applicationprogram data units (APDUs) between the token management system 120 andthe token. The security client 130 may be further configured to displayuser interfaces as the token processing system 120 directs, i.e.,prompting the user for credentials and/or PIN, displaying token status.

In some embodiments, the token management 120 may initiate tokenenrollment. The security client 130 may detect the presence of theinserted security token and notifies the token management system 120.The token management 120 may prompt the security client 130 to display auser interface querying the user to begin the enrollment process. Thesecurity client 130 may forward a card identification (CID) of thetoken. The CID uniquely identifies the token and is set during themanufacture of the token.

The token management system 120 comprises of several modules, asdepicted in FIG. 2. FIG. 2 shows an exemplary architecture of the tokenmanagement system 120 in accordance with another embodiment. It shouldbe readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that the tokenmanagement system 120 depicted in FIG. 2 represents a generalizedschematic illustration and that other components may be added orexisting components may be removed or modified. Moreover, the tokenmanagement system 120 may be implemented using software components,hardware components, or combinations thereof.

As shown in FIG. 2, the token management system 120 includes a tokenprocessing system (labeled as TPS in FIG. 2) 205, a token key service(TKS) module 210, a data recovery manager (DRM) module 215, acertificate authority (CA) module 220, and a security domain (SD)manager module 225. These components will now be briefly described.

The TPS 205 may be configured to act as a registration authority. TheTPS 205 may direct the enrollment process. The TPS 205 may be configuredto act a gateway between security clients 130 and tokens and the modulesof the token management system 120.

In some embodiments, the TPS 205 provides a configurable profile-basedscheme to handle enrollment requests by using a profile database. Thisdatabase may be stored locally on the TPS 205 or may reside on anothermachine, such as a dedicated server which is then remotely coupled tothe TPS 205. Such a scheme may be desirable where the TPS 205 is coupledto multiple sets of CAs, KRAs, and TKSs, and the like. For example, eachenrollment request from client 110 may comprise a list of parameters,such as an ATR, a CUID, a key version, an applet version, and profileidentifier. The TPS 205 may then match these parameters to one or moreof its profiles. The TPS 205 may select a profile based on the matchesof the profile to the parameters provided in the enrollment request. Theprofile then indicates various aspects of enrollment, such as the numberof keys to generate on the token, the token label, and the connectioninformation between the applicable CA, DRM, and TKS to be used formanaging the client 110.

For example, upon receiving an enrollment request from one of clients110, the TPS 205 will typically establish a secure communication channelwith client 110. To do that, the TPS 205 may connect to the TKS 210,which has the master key for the client 110 that was used to create thekeys on the token. Accordingly, the TPS 205 may query its profiledatabase and determine which TKS to route the enrollment request. Inaddition, the TPS 205 may use its profile database to determine which CAto request a certificate and which DRM to use for key escrow. Of courseother aspects of operations may be indicated in the profile frameworkused by the TPS 205.

The TKS module 210 may be configured to maintain master keys for thetokens. The TKS module 210 may also store symmetric keys associated withthe token. These keys may be derived from a single master key combinedwith smart card serial number or identification number, i.e., the CID.The manufacturer of the smart card may store these symmetric keys ontothe token. The manufacturer may also forward the single master key tothe administrator of the token management system 120, who installs thekey into the TKS module 210. For server side key generation requests,the manufacturer installed symmetric keys are replaced with the servergenerated keys which are derived the server master key. The TKS module210 may also be configured to hold a public key of the DRM module 215 asa server transport key, STK, in an encrypted secure database.

The DRM module 215 may be configured to maintain a database of encryptedsubject's private keys, which can be recovered on demand by anappropriate process. The DRM module 215 may also be configured togenerate a subject public key (SPuK) and a subject private key (SPrivK),where the subject may represent a user, device, or other entity such asorganization, association, etc. The DRM module 215 may be furtherconfigured to retrieve a storage key, SK. The storage key, SK, may be aprivate permanent storage key owned by the DRM module 215. The DRMmodule 215 may generate a storage session key, SSK, to encrypt thesubject private key, SPrivK, with the storage session key, SSK, toarrive at a wrapped private key, SSK(SPrivK) and encrypt the storagesession key, SSK, with the storage key, SK, to arrive at a wrappedstorage session key, SK(SSK). These wrapped keys, SSK(SPrivK) andSK(SSK) are archived or escrowed for later recovery.

In general, CA module 220 is configured to issue and sign certificates.The CA module 220 may distribute and install certificates using wellknown Web protocols, such as HTML/HTTPS or XML/HTTPS. The CA module 220may use the well-known standard RSA digital signatures. For example, theCA module 220 may be configured to generate certificates, such as X.509certificates, in response to received subject public key information andcertificate enrollment requests.

However, the SD module 225 may support customizable security policytemplates that can be adapted for various certificate managementpolicies and support automated online authentication checks againstexisting databases in token management system 120. In addition, the SDmodule 225 may support cross certification with other domains and/orsystems, and thus, support the creation and cross signing of another SDmodule in another system (not shown). In some embodiments, profiles areprovided to handle a variety of types of requests, such as enrollmentrequest, pin-reset request, and format requests. Pin reset requests iswhere the end user request to reset the token password. A format requestis where the end user requests to format his/her token. Of course, anytype of requests may be handled by a profile. The SD module 225 may alsodistribute certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) toLDAP-compliant servers, such as a directory server. As part of itsservices, the SD module 225 will typically be in communication with theother components of token management system 120 and other entities, suchas a directory server (not shown).

In order to assist in protecting the services of the CA module 220, itmay be elected the manager of a security domain. The SD module 225serves as a centralized registry of services that may be utilized by theCA module 220 and others. For example, the CA module 220, the DRM module215, and the TKS module 210 may register themselves with the SD module225 to join the security domain. Each security domain has a domainmanager. For example, CA module 220 can create a security domain and beelected as its manager. The SD module 225 may also store correspondingcertificates for these components so that the CA module 220 canauthenticate itself to the other components that it attempts to securelycommunicate with. In some embodiments, these modules may includesoftware that automates their registration with the SD module 225. Forexample, the registration by these components may be performed uponstartup or installation and at periodic intervals thereafter. Of course,this registration may be manually initiated by an administrator or someother authorized party.

In general, a security domain may be any group of entities that share acommon set of policies and have some form of trust relationship. Forexample, a security domain may contain a set of services/subsystems suchas a CA, a DRM, TKS, a OCSP and a TPS. Based on the registration, the SDmodule 225 may then provide a topology or list that indicates thenetwork-based or trust-based topology of the security domain, such asthe locations of components, the relationship between components. Forexample, an administrator or some other authorized party may utilize abrowser application to access the SD module 225 and display the storedtopology information.

The SD module 225 may also serve as a distribution point for securitypolicies. A security policy may comprise any information that indicates,for example, a set of trusted certificate authorities, certificatetemplates, certificate revocation lists, and the locations of theservices in the enterprise security system. Of note, the securitypolicies may be arranged in various ways. For example, differentsecurity policies may share a peer-to-peer relationship or aparent-child relationship. Of course, other forms of relationshipsbetween security policies may be implemented by the SD module 225.

Accordingly, the SD module 225 provides a platform to automaticallymanage the security domains of token management system 120.Conventionally, an administrator of the token management system 120would be required to manually configure the CA module 220 for securecommunications with the other components of the token management system120. However, with the use of the SD module 225, the CA module 220 mayautomatically discover the topology of the applicable security domainand commence communications with the other components. One skilled inthe art will recognize that the security policy database may provide itsinformation in a variety of forms that are LDAP-compliant or based onextensible markup language (XML).

In various embodiments, the TPS 205 may receive an enrollment requestand CID from the security client 130. To establish a secure channelbetween TPS and the client, the TPS module 205 may forward the CID ofthe token 130 from the enrollment request to the TKS module 210. The TKSmodule 210 may be configured to derive a key encryption key, KEK, thatis used in encrypting other secret keys intended for the specific tokenwithin the token management system 120. More particularly, the TKSmodule 120 may be configured to apply a pre-defined function is used toderive the key encryption key, KEK, based on the CID from the token 130.The TKS module 210 may also generate a key transport session key, KTSK.The TKS module 210 may encrypt the key transport session key (KTSK) withthe key encryption key (KEK) to arrive at a first encrypted or wrappedkey transport session key, KEK(KTSK). If the TPS profile determines thatserver-side key generation should be performed on the request, the TPS205 will forward key generation request to the DRM module 215.

The TKS module 210 may retrieve a server transport key, STK, where theserver transport key may be a public key issued by the DRM module 215.The TKS module 210 may wrap the key transport session key, KTSK, with aserver transport key, STK, to arrive at a second wrapped key transportsession key, STK(KTSK). The TKS module 210 may forward the first wrappedkey transport session key, KEK(KTSK) and the second wrapped keytransport session key STK(KTSK) to the TPS 205.

The TPS 205 may be configured to forward the second wrapped keytransport session key, STK(KTSK) and the server-side key generationrequest to the DRM module 215 while temporarily holding the firstwrapped key transport session key, KEK(KTSK). The DRM module 215 may beconfigured to generate an asymmetric key pair, i.e., a subject publicand a private (SPuK/SPrivK) key pair in response to receiving aserver-side key generation request, where the subject may represent auser, device or other entity such as an organization, association, etc.

The DRM module 215 may also be configured to retrieve a storage key, SK,which is a permanent private storage key owned by the DRM module 215 andto generate a storage session key, SSK. The DRM module 215 may then wrapthe subject private key, SPrivK with the storage session key, SSK, i.e.,STK(SPrivK) and wrap the storage session key, SSK, with the storage key,SK, i.e., SK(SSK). The DRM module 215 may then archive or escrow thesewrapped keys for later recovery in the event of a lost or destroyedtoken.

The DRM module 215 may be further configured to decrypt the secondwrapped transport key, STK(KTSK), to obtain the key transport sessionkey, KTSK with the complementary key of the of the server transport keyused in the TKS module 210. The server transport key and itscomplementary key may be symmetric or asymmetric as long as they areshared between the DRM module 215 and the TKS module 210. The DRM module215 may then wrap the subject private key, SPrivK, with the keytransport session key, KTSK, as a wrapped private key, KTSK(SPrivK). TheDRM module 215 may forward the wrapped private key, KTSK(SPrivK) and thesubject public key, SPuK, to the TPS 205.

The TPS 205 may forward the wrapped private key, KTSK(SPrivK) and thefirst wrapped key transport session key, KEK(KTSK), to the securityclient 130 to write into the token. The forwarded wrapped keys(KEK(KTSK) and KTSK(SPrivK)) are received at the token to be injectedtherein. For the sake of completeness, the token may execute an appletthat can retrieve the key encryption key. Accordingly, the applet mayunwrap the first wrapped key transport session key, KEK(KTSK) toretrieve the key transport session key, KTSK. The applet then uses thekey transport session key, KTSK, to unwrap the wrapped private key,KTK(SPrivK) to retrieve the subject private key, SPrivK. SPuK can eitherbe injected or derived from SPrivK.

The TPS 205 may be further configured to send a certificate enrollmentrequest along with information related to the subject public key, SPuK,to the CA module 220 for certificates for the token. The TPS 205 maysubsequently forward received certificates from the CA module 220 to thesecurity client 130. Subsequently, the certificates are written into thetoken.

FIG. 3 illustrate a flow diagram 300 executed by the token managementsystem 120 in accordance with another embodiment. It should be readilyapparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that the flow diagram 300depicted in FIG. 3 represents a generalized illustration and that othersteps may be added or existing steps may be removed or modified.

As shown in FIG. 3, the TPS 205 may receive an enrollment request andthe CID from the security client 130 because the user has inserted a newtoken in the security device 125, in step 305. The TPS 205 may thenidentify the parameters in the enrollment request, such as the Answer ToReset (ATR), CID, key version, applet version, and a profile identifier.The TPS 205 may then perform a query against its profile framework todetermine a profile that matches these parameters. For example, from theprofile, the TPS 205 may determine that the inserted token requiresserver-side key generation and key archiving based on configurationpolicies set up by the system administrator. Alternatively, in otherembodiments, the user of the token may request server-side keygeneration and/or key archiving. In addition, from the profile itretrieves, the TPS 205 may determine the locations the CA module 220,the DRM module 215, and the TKS module 210 and the appropriatecommunications methods to interface these components.

For example, subsequently, the TPS 205 may forward the CID to the TKSmodule 210, in step 310, based on the information in the profile. Instep 315, the TKS module 210 may be configured to derive a keyencryption key, KEK. Within the TKS module 210, the key encryption key,KEK, may be derived by applying a pre-define function to the servermaster key and the CID. The key encryption key, KEK, may be configuredto encrypt other secret keys intended for the inserted token that isassociated, i.e., owns, the KEK in the token management system 120. TheTKS module 210 may also be configured to generate a key transportsession key, KTSK, for use in the duration of an enrollment or arecovery session.

In step 320, the TKS module 210 may encrypt the key transport sessionkey, KTSK, with the key encryption key, KEK, to arrive at a firstencrypted or wrapped key transport session key, KEK(KTSK). In step 325,the TKS module 210 may retrieve a server transport key, STK, and wrapthe key transport session key (KTSK) with the server transport key, STK,to arrive at a second wrapped key transport session key, STK(KTSK).

In step 330, the TKS module 210 may forward the first wrapped keytransport session key, KEK(KTSK) and the second wrapped key transportsession key, STK(KTSK) to the TPS 205. In step 335, again based on theprofile it originally retrieved, the TPS 205 may be configured toforward the second wrapped key transport session key, STK(KTSK), and theserver-side key generation request to the DRM module 215 whiletemporarily holding the first wrapped key transport session key,KEK(KTSK).

In step 340, the DRM module 215 may be configured to generate anasymmetric key pair, i.e., a subject public and a private (SPuK/SPrivK,respectively) key pair in response to receiving the server-side keygeneration request from the TPS 205. In step 345, the DRM module 215 mayalso be configured to retrieve a storage key, SK, and generate a storagesession key, SSK.

In step 350, the DRM module 215 may be further configured to wrap thesubject private key, SPrivK, with the storage session key, SSK, toarrive at a wrapped storage private key, SSK(SPrivK). The DRM module 215may also wrap the storage session key, SSK, with the storage key, SK, toarrive at a wrapped storage session key, SK(SSK). These wrapped keys,SSK(SPrivK) and SK(SSK), may be stored or escrowed in the DRM module215.

In step 355, the DRM module 215 may decrypt, i.e., unwrap, the secondwrapped key transport session key, STK(KTSK) with the complementary keyof the server transport key, STK, used in the TKS module 210. In step360, the DRM module 215 may then wrap the subject private key, SPrivK,with the key transport session key, KTSK as a wrapped private key,KTSK(SPrivK). In step 365, the DRM module 215 may forward the wrappedprivate key, KTSK(SPrivK) and the subject public key, SPuK to the TPS205.

In step 370, the TPS 205 may forward the wrapped private key,KTSK(SPrivK) and the first wrapped key transport session key, KEK(KTSK),to the security client 130 to write into the token. The forwardedwrapped keys are received at the token to be injected therein. The TPS205 may forward these keys based on the information in the profile.

In step 375, the TPS 205 may be further configured to send a certificateenrollment request with information related to the subject public key,SPuK, to the CA module 220 for certificates for the token. The TPS 205may locate the CA module 220 from information in the retrieved profile.In step 380, the TPS 205 may subsequently forward received certificatesfrom the CA module 220 to the security client 130. Subsequently, thecertificates are written into the token.

FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary block diagram of a computing platform400 where an embodiment may be practiced. The functions of the securityclient and token management system may be implemented in program codeand executed by the computing platform 400. The security client andtoken management system may be implemented in computer languages such asPASCAL, C, C++, JAVA, etc.

As shown in FIG. 4, the computer system 400 includes one or moreprocessors, such as processor 402 that provide an execution platform forembodiments of the security client and token management system. Commandsand data from the processor 402 are communicated over a communicationbus 404. The computer system 400 also includes a main memory 406, suchas a Random Access Memory (RAM), where the security client and tokenmanagement system may be executed during runtime, and a secondary memory408. The secondary memory 408 includes, for example, a hard disk drive410 and/or a removable storage drive 412, representing a floppy diskettedrive, a magnetic tape drive, a compact disk drive, etc., where a copyof a computer program embodiment for the security client and tokenmanagement system may be stored. The removable storage drive 412 readsfrom and/or writes to a removable storage unit 414 in a well-knownmanner. A user interfaces with the security client and token managementsystem with a keyboard 416, a mouse 418, and a display 420. The displayadapter 422 interfaces with the communication bus 404 and the display420 and receives display data from the processor 402 and converts thedisplay data into display commands for the display 420.

Certain embodiments may be performed as a computer program. The computerprogram may exist in a variety of forms both active and inactive. Forexample, the computer program can exist as software program(s) comprisedof program instructions in source code, object code, executable code orother formats; firmware program(s); or hardware description language(HDL) files. Any of the above can be embodied on a computer readablemedium, which include storage devices and signals, in compressed oruncompressed form. Exemplary computer readable storage devices includeconventional computer system RAM (random access memory), ROM (read-onlymemory), EPROM (erasable, programmable ROM), EEPROM (electricallyerasable, programmable ROM), and magnetic or optical disks or tapes.Exemplary computer readable signals, whether modulated using a carrieror not, are signals that a computer system hosting or running thepresent invention can be configured to access, including signalsdownloaded through the Internet or other networks. Concrete examples ofthe foregoing include distribution of executable software program(s) ofthe computer program on a CD-ROM or via Internet download. In a sense,the Internet itself, as an abstract entity, is a computer readablemedium. The same is true of computer networks in general.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method of generating credentials for aprogrammable token, the method comprising: receiving, by a server, atoken request and an identifier for the programmable token; generating akey encryption key based on a server master key and the identifier forthe programmable token; encrypting a key transport session key with thekey encryption key to create a wrapped key transport session key;generating a subject key pair within the server, wherein the subject keypair includes a subject public key and a subject private key; encryptingthe subject private key with the key transport session key to create awrapped private key; and forwarding the wrapped private key and thewrapped key transport session key to the programmable token.
 2. Themethod of claim 1, further comprising selecting a profile for anenrollment request of the programmable token.
 3. The method of claim 1,further comprising selecting a profile for a pin-reset request of theprogrammable token.
 4. The method of claim 1, further comprisingselecting a profile for a format request of the programmable token. 5.The method of claim 1, further comprising: selecting a profile for theprogrammable token based on the token request; identifying a datarecovery manager from the profile; and retrieving a server transport keyfrom a data recovery manager.
 6. A method of generating credentials fora programmable token, the method comprising; receiving, by a server, atoken request and an identifier for the programmable token; selecting aprofile for the programmable token based on the token request;generating a key encryption key based on a server master key and theidentifier for the programmable token; encrypting a key transportsession key with the key encryption key to create a wrapped keytransport session key; generating a subject key pair within the server,wherein the subject key pair includes a subject public key and a subjectprivate key; encrypting the subject private key with the key transportsession key to create a wrapped private key; forwarding the wrappedprivate key and the wrapped key transport session key to theprogrammable token; identifying a data recovery manager from theprofile; and storing a wrapped storage private key and a wrapped storagepublic key in the data recovery manager.
 7. The method of claim 1,further comprising: selecting a profile for the programmable token basedon the token request; identifying a certificate authority from theprofile; transmitting a certificate enrollment request with informationrelated to a subject public key to the certificate authority module; andforwarding any received certificates to the programmable token.
 8. Anon-transitory computer-readable medium including computer executableinstructions for performing a method comprising: receiving, by a server,a token request and an identifier for the programmable token; generatinga key encryption key based on a server master key and the identifier forthe programmable token; encrypting a key transport session key with thekey encryption key to create a wrapped key transport session key;generating a subject key pair within the server, wherein the subject keypair includes a subject public key and a subject private key; encryptingthe subject private key with the key transport session key to create awrapped private key; and forwarding the wrapped private key and thewrapped key transport session key to the programmable token.
 9. A systemfor generating credentials for a programmable token, the systemcomprising: a programmable token; a security client configured to managethe programmable token; and a security server configured to interfacewith the security client, wherein the security server is configured toreceive a token request and a token identifier, generate a keyencryption key based on a server master key and the token identifier,encrypt the key transport session key with the key encryption key tocreate a wrapped key transport session key, generate a subject key pairwithin the security server, wherein the subject key pair includes asubject public key and a subject private key, encrypt the subjectprivate key with a key transport session key to create a wrapped privatekey, and forward the wrapped private key and the wrapped key transportsession key to the programmable token.
 10. The system of claim 9,wherein the security server is further configured to select a profilefor enrolling the programmable token, and wherein the security serverfurther comprises: a token processing system configured to manage theinterface between the security client and the security server based onthe profile; a key service module configured to interface with the tokenprocessing system; a certificate authority module configured tointerface with the token processing system and to manage the certificatelife cycle of certificates; and a data recovery manager (DRM) moduleconfigured to interface with the token processing gateway and configuredto maintain a database of private keys, wherein the DRM module isconfigured to store the subject private key.
 11. The system of claim 10,wherein the key service module is further configured to forward a firstwrapped key transport session key and a second wrapped key transportsession key to the token processing system based on the profile.
 12. Thesystem of claim 10, wherein the token processing system is furtherconfigured to locate the DRM module from the profile and forward awrapped key transport session key to the DRM module based on theprofile.
 13. The system of claim 10, wherein the DRM module is furtherconfigured to forward a wrapped subject private key to the tokenprocessing system in response to the server-side key parameters based onthe profile.
 14. The system of claim 10, wherein the token processingsystem is further configured to transmit a certificate enrollmentrequest and information related to the subject public key to thecertificate authority module based on the profile.
 15. The system ofclaim 10, wherein the token processing system is further configured toforward any generated certificates to the programmable token at thesecurity client.
 16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium ofclaim 8, wherein the method further comprises: selecting a profile foran enrollment request of the programmable token.
 17. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the method furthercomprises: selecting a profile for a pin-reset request of theprogrammable token.
 18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium ofclaim 8, wherein the method further comprises: selecting a profile for aformat request of the programmable token.
 19. The non-transitorycomputer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the method furthercomprises: selecting a profile for the programmable token based on thetoken request; identifying a data recovery manager from the profile; andretrieving a server transport key from a data recovery manager.
 20. Thenon-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the methodfurther comprises: selecting a profile for the programmable token basedon the token request; identifying a certificate authority from theprofile; transmitting a certificate enrollment request with informationrelated to a subject public key to the certificate authority module; andforwarding any received certificates to the programmable token.